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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BEYOND THE BENNETT AMENDMENT:
ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE
OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION IN
COMPENSATION UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Pay Act of 19631 (EPA or the Act) prohibits an
employer from paying a lower wage to employees of one sex than it
pays to those of the opposite sex for performing jobs which require
"equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions."' 2 Although an employee suing
under the Act need not prove that the alleged pay disparity results
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
Id. § 206(d)(1) (1976). Section 206(d)(1) provides in pertinent part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such es-
tablishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other fac-
tor other than sex ....
Id.
Approximately 30 states have enacted the same or similar legislation banning wage dis-
crimination based on sex. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.155 (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-341
(West Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-333 (Supp. 1979); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West
Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-75 (West 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 387-4 (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 44-1702 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 4A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4 (Burns 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.423 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 628 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
17.255(17) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.67 (West Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1221
(1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.017 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37 (1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:11-56.2 (West 1965); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (Page Supp. 1979); GR.
REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 336.3 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-6-18 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-12-15 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §
50-321 (1977); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.6 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.175 (1976); W. VA.
CODE § 21-5B-3 (1978); Wvo. STAT. § 27-4-302 (1977).
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from the employer's discriminatory motives,s the Act provides for
relief only in those cases where an employee is able to prove that
his job is "substantially equal" to a job held by a member of the
opposite sex.4
In an attempt to circumvent the substantially equal standard
of the EPA, employees who have been victims of sexual discrimi-
nation in compensation have often sued under section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 which, in general, prohibits
discriminatory employment practices.' Indeed, the language of Ti-
tle VII is broad enough to encompass controversies not involving
substantially equal jobs,7 although in certain cases under Title VII,
3 See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974); Hodgson v. American
Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); Ross & McDermott, The Equal Pay Act
of 1963: A Decade of Enforcement, 16 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1974). See also
29 C.F.R. § 800.115 (1979).
' Although a literal reading of the Act would appear to require that the jobs performed
by male and female employees be absolutely equal in skill, effort and responsibility, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), it is now settled that properly construed, the statute imposes a stan-
dard of "substantial equality," see note 22 infra. Mere comparability of jobs, however, is
insufficient to establish a prima facie case under the Act. Christopher v. Iowa, 559 F.2d
1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 1977); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir.
1977); Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., 441 F. Supp. 279, 285 (W.D. Mo. 1977); see Usery v.
Richman, 558 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1977).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976)
6 E.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); Gunther v.
County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov.
4, 1980) (No. 80-429); Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979);
Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Com-
merce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Keyes
v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Calage v.
University of Tenn., 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511
F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th
Cir. 1971); Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Va. 1979); IUE v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980); Lemons v. Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. Colo. 1978),
af'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No.
80-82); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Chrapliwy v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp.
448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
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it may be necessary to prove discriminatory intent.8 Nevertheless,
a section of Title VII known as the Bennett Amendment, in-
tended to harmonize the two acts by rendering lawful a compensa-
tion differential "authorized" by the EPA,10 has consistently been
interpreted as incorporating the substantially equal standard into
Title VII." Recently, however, the proscriptive ambit of Title VII
has been enlarged significantly by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. In Gunther v. County of Washington,2 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporates cer-
tain affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII, and not the
substantially equal standard itself.'3
In light of the Gunther holding, subsequently approved by at
least two other courts, 4 this Note will explore several theories,
other than equal pay for equal work, under which claims of sex-
based wage discrimination may be brought under Title VII. To-
ward this end, the Note will commence with a discussion of the
8 See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
' The Bennett Amendment, codified in the last sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976), provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid ... if such differentiation is authorized by the provi-
sions of section 206(d) of Title 29.
Id.
10 See note 45 infra.
" See, e.g., Marshall v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 605 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1979);
DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Christensen v. Iowa,
563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170-
71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th
Cir. 1971); Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1038-39 (W.D. Va. 1979); IUE
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 457 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980); Lemons v. Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 912
(D. Colo. 1978), afl'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S.
Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-82); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 266 (N.D. Ind.
1977); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1767 (D. Conn. 1979),
presents an interesting twist to the majority rule that a claim under Title VII for sexual
discrimination in compensation is subject to the "substantial equality" strictures of the Act.
In Johnson, the court applied collateral estoppel to deny a Title VII claim for wage discrim-
ination where there had already been a jury verdict for the defendant under the EPA. Id. at
1768-69.
1 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 80-
429).
11 Id. at 1311.
IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980); Fitz-
gerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980). See note 73 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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EPA, Title VII and the controversy that has arisen concerning the
proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment. Following this
discussion, the Gunther case will be analyzed, and its conclusion
with respect to the effect of the Bennett Amendment will be en-
dorsed. Finally, in view of the expansive ambit of Title VII as in-
terpreted by the Gunther court, the elements of a prima facie case
under the statute will be suggested.
THE EQUAL PAY ACT
In enacting the EPA in 1963, Congress attempted to fashion
an objective standard for determining the existence of sexual dis-
crimination in compensation.1 5 Pay differentials based on sex be-
tween equal rather than comparable jobs were proscribed,", appar-
ently out of a desire to keep the courts from engaging in job
evaluation. 17 Notwithstanding Congress' intent, however, the
equality standard has not streamlined litigation under the Act be-
cause the standard has been given numerous different interpreta-
tions by courts applying it.18 As a consequence, EPA claims are
adjudicated on a case-by-case basiss that necessarily requires judi-
15 See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
16 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The concept of equal pay for equal work was not novel
when Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963. See BNA OPERATIONS MANUAL, EQUAL
PAY FOR EQUAL WORK, FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF 1963 at 3 (1963). In 1918, the Railroad
Administration issued an order requiring equal pay. Elisburg, Equal Pay in the United
States: The Development and Implementation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 LAB. L.J.
195, 195 (1978). Pursuant to the Classification Act of 1923, salary grades for federal employ-
ees were based on component job elements and were undifferentiated by sex. Id. Moreover,
numerous equal pay bills were introduced in Congress prior to the passage of the Act in
1963, including 72 such bills between the 82nd and 86th Congresses. BNA OPERATIONS MAN-
UAL, supra, at 4.
In choosing the standard of equal work, Congress was no doubt aware that a standard
of comparability had been used previously during World War II by the National War Labor
Board. See Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protec-
tions Under Title VII, 8 Loy. CH. L.J. 723, 734-36 (1977). Moreover, prior attempts to
introduce equal pay legislation had contained a standard of comparability. See, e.g., Hear-
ings on H.R. 8898 and H.R. 10,226 Before the Select Subcomm. of the House Lab. and
Educ. Comm., 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 166 (1963).
11 See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
18 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text infra. The congressional debate itself indi-
cates differences in understanding of the meaning of "equal work." See 109 CONG. REC.
9197, 9761 (1963). Representative Goodell stated that in substituting the word equal for
comparable, Congress' intention was to narrow the concept. Id. at 9197. The jobs should, he
stated, be virtually identical. Id. In the Senate, however, Senator McNamara stated that it
was not the intent of the Senate that the jobs be identical. Id. at 9761. Such a conclusion, he
observed, would be "ridiculous." Id.
'9 See, e.g., Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 861 (10th Cir.
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cial job evaluation.2 0
In at least one early case brought under the Act, the court
construed the equality standard as requiring proof that allegedly
equal jobs require equal skill, equal effort, and equal responsibil-
ity.21 Although subsequent courts have relaxed this standard, ap-
plying instead a test of "substantial equality,"22 they are divided
1976); Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Home, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir.
1972).
20 See, e.g., Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (3d Cir. 1977);
Thompson v. Boyle, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 57, 63-64 (D.D.C. 1979); Kohne v. IMCO
Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1038-39 (W.D. Va. 1979); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
449 F. Supp. 397, 402 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
21 See Wirtz v. Basic, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Nev. 1966). The Wirtz court did
note, however, that "insubstantial differences" in skill, effort, and responsibility were to be
ignored. Id.
22 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970), was the first case under the Equal Pay Act to utilize the term "substantially equal."
Id. at 265. The vast majority of cases after Wheaton Glass have adhered to the substantially
equal standard. See Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175 (3d Cir. 1977);
Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 861 (10th Cir. 1976); Brennan v.
Owensboro-Davies County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
973 (1976); Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 822 (1973); Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd sub
nom. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co.,
457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th
Cir. 1972); Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970).
Notwithstanding the large number of courts that have adopted the substantially equal
standard, two divergent interpretations-perhaps reflecting the inconsistency in the con-
gressional debate on the meaning of equal work, see note 18 supra-have emerged. A minor-
ity of courts have held that job content, as well as skill, effort, and responsibility must be
substantially equal. Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir.
1977); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238-40 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v.
Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
456 F. Supp. 65, 69 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 453 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Calage v. University of Tenn., 400 F. Supp. 32, 37 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), afl'd, 544
F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976). Indeed, the strict examination of actual job tasks mandated by this
construction of the EPA narrows the scope of the statute to such an extent that if, upon
initial analysis, the job tasks are not determined to be substantially equal, there is no need
to even attempt to examine skill, effort, and responsibility. See Christopher v. Iowa, 559
F.2d 1135, 1139 n.16 (8th Cir. 1977).
Under the more accepted interpretation, however, which was applied by the Third
Circuit in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970), the
factors enumerated in the Act-skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working condi-
tions-were themselves to be compared, and jobs were substantially equal when, after ignor-
ing insubstantial differences, these factors were substantially equal. Id. at 265; see, e.g.,
Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1977); Katz v. School Dist., 557 F.2d
153, 156 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 863 (10th
Cir. 1976); Thompson v. Boyle, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 57, 73-74 (D.D.C. 1979); Cullari v.
East-West Gateway Coordinating Council, 457 F. Supp. 335, 341 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Brennan
v. Board of Educ., 374 F. Supp. 817, 828-30 (D.N.J. 1974); Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317
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on whether the statutory factors of skill, effort, and responsibility
may be aggregated in determining if jobs are substantially equal.2
If these factors may not be aggregated, there can be no finding that
two jobs involve equal work unless they are determined to be sub-
stantially equal with respect to each individual factor.24 In con-
trast, if the factors may be aggregated, an employee need only
demonstrate that the skill, effort, and responsibility required to
perform his job are collectively equal to that required to perform a
job held by a member of the opposite sex. 25
The aggregation approach was endorsed in Hodgson v. Daisy
F. Supp. 538, 541-42 (W.D. Ark. 1970), modified per curiam, 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971).
Courts taking this approach have stressed that the content of the individual jobs in question
does not have to be identical if the jobs require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. See,
e.g., Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. South Davis
Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 862-63 (10th Cir. 1976). Notably, when there is a common
core of tasks in the two jobs in question, the question under this construction of the statute
becomes how different the noncommon tasks must be to preclude a finding of equal work.
See Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31
ARK. L. REV. 545, 573-74 (1978). Among the criteria considered in determining whether two
"common core" jobs are substantially equal are how frequently the different tasks are per-
formed, the amount of time necessary to perform each additional task, and whether they
have some special significance. See generally, 29 C.F.R. § 800.122(a) (1979); Sullivan, supra,
at 573-74. In addition, courts, beginning with Wheaton Glass, have developed the "'least
different' and 'most alike' principle." Sullivan, supra, at 574-76. The rule has been stated:
"Given a substantial, predominant core of work common to two jobs, the inequality of non-
common work must be assessed in terms of the tasks done by those in the favored class
whose work least differs from that done by those in the disfavored class." Id. at 574 (em-
phasis added). See Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356, 360-61 (8th Cir.
1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
905 (1970).
2' See Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1977);
Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1038-39 (W.D. Va. 1979); Krumbeck v.
John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257, 260 (E.D. Wis. 1970). See also Chrapliwy v. Uni-
royal, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 795, 806 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
24 See Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1977); Angelo v. Ba-
charach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1977). It has been held, moreover,
that the concept of effort entails only physical effort. Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d at
960. But cf. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 402-03 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(greater caseload of claims representatives could be balanced against the generally higher
dollar value of the cases of claims adjustors). Thus, it has been held that a female "light
assembler" could not compensate for the difference in physical effort between her job and
that of a male "heavy assembler" by showing that her job involved greater mental-visual
acuity. Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1977).
21 See Thompson v. Boyle, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 57, 73-74 (D.D.C. 1979); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 402-03 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Brennan v. Houston En-
dowment, Inc., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. T 9204, at 7008 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1190 (5th
Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp.
538, 541 (W.D. Ark. 1970), modified per curiam, 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971).
1980]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:738
Manufacturing Co.,2" where the court compared "heavy" jobs (held
entirely by males), requiring substantial physical effort, to "light"
jobs (held exclusively by females), requiring substantial skill and
responsibility.27 Although acknowledging that male employees were
required to expend greater physical effort than were female em-
ployees, the court found this difference to be offset by the more
demanding mental effort required of the women employees.2"
While a strict interpretation of the Act would preclude a compari-
son of dissimilar jobs, 9 the court, apparently engaging in its own
evaluation of the job's worth,30 encountered little difficulty in con-
cluding that different jobs could be equally valuable to the
employer.$1
A much more sophisticated job evaluation analysis was uti-
lized in Thompson v. Boyle.32 In Thompson, female employees of
28 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), modified per curiam, 445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir.
1971).
27 317 F. Supp. at 551.
28 Id. at 543-44. The court initially observed that a wage differential in favor of males
could not be justified merely because males handled more physically demanding duties. Id.
Absent evidence as to the amount of time such duties consumed and whether all males who
received the higher pay devoted approximately the same amount of time to such duties,
greater weight may not be accorded to physical effort, the court held, than is accorded to
skill, responsibility, and working conditions. Id. The court's conclusion was predicated on
the testimony of an industrial psychologist who testified that the risk of injury to women in
their jobs-placing parts in high-speed presses-necessitated a high degree of mental and
physical attention for sustained periods, resulting in mental stress and fatigue. Id. at 543.
Moreover, the court noted that the Department of Labor defined "effort" in terms of "the
physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job," 29 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1979)
(emphasis added). 317 F. Supp. at 543. Although Department of Labor guidelines do not
have the force of law, courts occasionally have relied on them in construing the EPA. See,
e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 153 n.3 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 946 (1977); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1973).
29 See, e.g., Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1173 (3d Cir. 1977)
(heavy and light bench assemblers); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 65, 69
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (advertising sales representatives and telephone sales representatives).
30 While job evaluation analysis has occasionally been performed by the courts, see
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Hodgson v. Unity-Frank-
ford Rack Serv., Inc., 21 Wage and Hour Cas. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the practice has been
common in arbitration for years. See generally C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RE-
LATIONs 308-09 (3d ed. of ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES 1970); R. WIGGINS, THE ARBrrRA-
TION OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING DISPUTES 91-121 (1970). The success of job evaluation in
the arbitration setting appears to indicate that courts are competent to compare unequal
jobs with regard to the factors in a job evaluation plan.
21 317 F. Supp. at 551. The court noted, "It would be absurd to contend, apart from the
statutory exceptions, that a male stock handler should be paid more than a female chemist
or computer operator, simply because the job of the male requires greater physical effort."
Id.
22 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 57 (D.D.C. 1979).
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the Government Printing Office, "Journeyman Bindery Workers,"
sued their employer under the Equal Pay Act alleging that they
were paid less than male "Bookbinders" for work involving equal
skill, effort, and responsibility." The jobs of males and females
were different-each used different machines to perform different
functions.3 Nevertheless, after hearing testimony of job evaluation
experts, the court accepted the conclusion of the plaintiffs' experts
that the jobs were substantially equal in skill, effort, and responsi-
bility.35 Significantly, the plaintiffs' expert on whom the court
placed its greatest reliance declined to attempt a task-by-task com-
parison, stating that he did not consider such a comparison to be
"the most significant [indicator] of the comparability of these two
occupations. 3 6 Rather, the expert preferred to view the individual
tasks as part of a "qualitatively similar continuum" requiring skill,
effort, and responsibility at levels interspersed on this scale.3 7
Although cases such as Daisy and Thompson are examples of
a liberal interpretation of the EPA, most courts continue to con-
" Id. at 60. The source of the pay differential was the Government Printing Office
(GPO) practice of patterning its pay scales on the general divisions between craft and non-
craft occupations maintained by private industry; the bookbinder job was a craft job while
the journeyman bindery worker job held noncraft status. Id. The court noted that the sexual
job segregation at the GPO arose because, traditionally, women were not able to obtain craft
bookbinder status in the industry either by undertaking a four-year apprenticeship program
or by obtaining equivalent experience. Id.
"I Id. at 61. Whereas major industrial machines were set up and operated by men, the
only machines operated by women were sewing machines. Id.
Id. at 74.
"Id. at 76. A task-by-task comparison frequently has been employed to determine
whether the jobs of female aides and male orderlies are substantially equal. In these cases,
most courts have recognized that the primary duties of both jobs involve patient care. See,
e.g., Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 863 (10th Cir. 1976); Hodgson
v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970). Nonetheless, these courts have
upheld wage differentials between aides and orderlies based on differences in effort exerted,
see, e.g., Shultz v. Royal Glades, Inc., 66 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,548, at 44,936 (S.D. Fla.
1971); Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 147-48 (E.D. Tex. 1971), differ-
ences in responsibilities, see, e.g., Shultz v. Kentucky Baptist Hosp., 62 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
32,296, at 44,121 (W.D. Ky. 1969), or differences in secondary or tertiary tasks, see, e.g.,
Hodgson v. Good Shepherd Hosp., 327 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Hodgson v. Wil-
liam & Mary Nursing Hotel, 20 Wage and Hour Cas. 10, 22 (M.D. Fla. 1971). Differences in
secondary and tertiary tasks will not justify a wage differential, however, if aides and order-
lies are practical substitutes for one another in the performance of their duties, Brennan v.
Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972
(1975), or if they perform their duties as a unit, Hodgson v. George W. Hubbard Hosp., Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 1295, 1297-98 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
17 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 63.
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strue the Act strictly.-3 Such construction, of course, tends to insu-
late from review discriminatory compensation practices, such as
underpayment and intentional reduction in wages on the basis of
sex. 9 Moreover, a strict adherence to the equal work standard pre-
cludes a job comparison based on other criteria, such as worth to
the employer.4 0 Thus, employees seeking relief from sex-based
wage discrimination have begun to rely on the broader language of
Title VII.
TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to pro-
vide a remedy for discrimination in employment on the ground of
race, religion, and national origin. 41 Although the original text of
the bill did not prohibit sexual discrimination,42 the final draft
contained a provision rendering such discrimination unlawful.43 In
addition, the final version of the statute contained an amendment,
known as the Bennett Amendment, which provides that a pay dif-
38 See note 4 supra.
3 See, e.g., Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 80-429); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 452, 457 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
588 (3d Cir. 1980).
It has been claimed that job segregation by sex results in disparities between female-
dominated and male-dominated jobs. See C. LLOYD, SEX, DISCRIMINATION AND THE DIVISION
OF LABOR 16 (1975); Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential
Protections Under Title VII, 8 Loy. CI. L.J. 723, 729-32 (1977). The argument is that the
pay of "female" jobs is depressed because of the association of such jobs with "women's
work." See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 398, 416-17 (1979); Josephine, Comparable Pay
for Comparable Work, 1977-1978 American Library Ass'n Council Document 1 (1978).
A fascinating account of systematic undervaluation of a female-dominated job is
presented in Gitt & Gelb, supra at 729. In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission challenged a rate hike proposed by The American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany before the Federal Communications Commission. At the time of the hearing, AT&T
was highly segregated by sex. Id. The job of "frameman" was designated as a male job. Id.
Prior to 1965, only one company, Michigan Bell, employed women in frame work. Id. At
Michigan, frame work was considered a clerical job, while all other companies regarded it as
a craft position. Id. When the other companies realized that they could no longer exclude
females from the frameman position, they converted the job to a female position. Id. A
lower rate of pay relative to other craft positions accompanied the conversion. Id.
10 See Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 1972).
41 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in UNITED STATES
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI
OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 2009 (1968).
'2 See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-78 (1964).
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
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ferential based on sex shall not be unlawful under Title VII if the
differential is authorized by the provisions of the EPA.44 The brief
legislative history of the amendment indicates that it was intended
to harmonize the two statutes but does not clarify the manner in
which this was to be accomplished.45
The judicial controversy regarding the proper interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment began in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,46
4 Id. § 2000e-2(h); see note 9 supra.
41 See 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964). Senator Bennett recognized the overlap between
Title VII and the EPA in the area of sexual discrimination in compensation. See id.
Describing the amendment as a "technical correction of the bill," id., his stated purpose in
introducing it was to ensure that in the event of conflict between the two statutes, the provi-
sions of the Act would not be nullified. Id.
A year after the passage of the Bennett Amendment, Senator Bennett read a brief into
the Congressional Record for the purpose of clarifying his intent in introducing the amend-
ment. See 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965). In pertinent part, it provided:
RELATION OF TITLE VII TO THE EQUAL PAY AcT: AN EXPLANATION OF THE BENNETT
AMENDMENT
The amendment speaks in terms of a "differentiation... authorized by the
provisions of section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act [the EPA]."
Section 6(d) authorizes two things:
1. Wage differentials as between exempt male and female employees doing the
same work; and
2. Wage differentials on equal jobs made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment prac-
tice; (a) to differentiate on the basis of sex in determining the compensation of
white collar and other employees who are exempt under the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act; or (b) to have different standards of compensation for non-
exempt employees, where such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Simply stated, the amendment means that discrimination in compensation on
account of sex does not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act.
Id.
While Senator Bennett may have intended his brief as a clarification of the meaning of
the Bennett Amendment, the brief is, if possible, more ambiguous than the amendment
itself. Senator Bennett's explanation of wage differentials that are authorized by section
6(d) (paragraphs "1" and "2") is contradicted by his statement in the last paragraph that
discrimination in compensation does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the Equal
Pay Act. Id.
After Senator Bennett's brief was read into the Congressional Record, Senator Dirksen
expressed surprise that the language of the Bennett Amendment had been questioned. Id. at
13360. He stated that he and his staff had carefully examined the amendment before it was
offered, and that he believed the language of the amendment spoke for itself. Id. In so
stating, he reiterated his belief, expressed at the time the amendment was introduced and
unchallenged by Senator Bennett, see 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964), that the amendment
merely recognizes the exceptions to the EPA. 111 CONG. REc. at 13360.
46 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
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where the court stated, in dicta, that the amendment mandated
that the EPA and Title VII be construed consistently in the area
in which they overlap.4 Although the court noted that the two
statutes were in pari materia, it did not attempt to state the pre-
cise manner in which they should be harmonized.48 The Wheaton
Glass court expressed concern, however, that the amendment not
be construed in a manner which would undermine Title Vl.EL
Nevertheless, until recently, this concern went unheeded as courts
construing the relationship between Title VII and the Act focused
more on the dicta in Wheaton Glass.5 Consequently, the scope of
Title VII was effectively limited as courts held that the Bennett
Amendment incorporated the equal work standard of the EPA into
Title VII.51
Recently, in an effort to determine more definitively the rela-
tionship between Title VII and the EPA, courts have placed
greater emphasis on the legislative history of the Bennett Amend-
ment. In IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,52 female electrical
production workers alleged that Westinghouse maintained a dual
wage structure," paying women less than men for jobs the em-
ployer evaluated as being equal in worth. 4 The women claimed
that certain female jobs corresponded to certain male jobs and that
Westinghouse evaluated them at equal point levels for skill, effort,
47 Id. at 266.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971). See also
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Lemons v. Den-
ver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 911-12 (D. Colo. 1978), aff'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-82).
51 Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 596 (8th Cir. 1978); Calage v. Uni-
versity of Tenn., 544 F.2d 297, 302 (6th Cir. 1976); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son, Inc.,
511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448
F.2d 117, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1971); Kohne v. IMCO Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1038-39
(W.D. Va. 1979); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 456-57
(D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980); Rinkel v. Associated Pipe-
line Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 225, 226 (D. Alaska 1978); Lemons v. Denver, 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 912 (D. Colo. 1978), afl'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-82); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
449 F. Supp. 397, 400-01 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 266
(W.D. Mo. 1977); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
82 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d
Cir. 1980).
13 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 451-52.
Id. at 452.
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and responsibility. Although the plaintiffs acknowledged that the
jobs were not equal,55 they claimed that the dual wage structure
constituted a violation of Title VII, since the employer itself recog-
nized the equal worth of the jobs. 5 6 The district court examined
the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment and concluded
that although not dispositive, 7 it tended to support the defen-
dant's contention that the equal work standard must be met for a
valid cause of action to exist under Title VII.58 The court therefore
dismissed the complaint, holding that since the plaintiffs admitted
that the jobs were not equal, they had not stated a claim for which
relief could be granted under Title VII.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, 0 reasoning, after a
thorough examination of the legislative history, EEOC regulations,
and caselaw, that a contrary decision would extend less protection
under Title VII to victims of wage discrimination on the' basis of
sex than is afforded to victims of such discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, or national origin." Observing that the legislative
materials on the Bennett Amendment were "remarkable only for
their equivocacy and turbidity, ' 62 the court interpreted a colloquy
between Senator Bennett and Senator Dirksen as signifying that
the amendment was intended to carry forward only the exceptions
55 Id.
56 Id. at 451-52. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that their claim arose out of
an official company policy promulgated by Westinghouse in 1938. Id. at 451. Westinghouse's
Industrial Relations Manual, dated February 1, 1939, stated:
The gradient of the women's wage curve ... is not the same for women as for
men because of the more transient character of the service of the former, the rela-
tive shortness of their activity in industry, the differences in environment re-
quired, the extra services that must be provided, overtime limitations, extra help
needed for the occasional heavy work, and the general sociological factors not re-
quiring discussion herein.
Brief for Appellants at 7, IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d
Cir. 1980).
57 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 454. The court acknowledged that "Congress did not give
fullest possible attention to the extent to which the sex discrimination provisions of Title
VII were to be coterminous with those prohibitions against discrimination based on factors
other than sex." Id.
58 Id.
"Id. at 457. The court stated that its ruling was based on the conclusion that "allega-
tions and proof of unequal pay for unequal, but comparable work does not state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under Title VII .... " Id.
10 IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (3d Cir. 1980).
61 Id. at 590, 592.
02 Id. at 594.
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to the EPA and not the substantially equal standard as well.6 As
further support for its conclusion, the court noted that EEOC reg-
ulations6 4 construing the relationship between Title VII and the
Act provide that the scope of Title VII is "coextensive with, but
not limited by," the proscriptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of which the EPA is a part."' Finally, examining the relevant
caselaw, the Third Circuit summarily rejected decisions holding
that Title VII incorporated the substantially equal standard of the
EPA. In those cases, the court stated, the "issue has generally not
been directly confronted for adjudication on a record similar to the
present one."6 6 Rather, the court found persuasive the decision of
the Ninth Circuit in Gunther v. County of Washington,67 which
was rendered subsequent to the lower court decision in IUE.8
In Gunther, female prison guards had brought suit against
their municipal employer, alleging, inter alia, that a portion of the
discrepancy between their salaries and those of the male guards
could be attributed only to sex discrimination.6 ' Noting that no
appellate court had addressed the question of whether Title VII
was broad enough to encompass discriminatory compensation
claims not predicated on a theory of equal pay for equal work,70
the Ninth Circuit examined the legislative history of the Bennett
Amendment in order to determine whether the amendment did in-
deed incorporate the equal work standard into Title VII. Stating
that "[tihe relevant legislative history, though sparse, is enlighten-
ing," the court concluded that Title VII was not limited by the
'3 Id. at 595. The court rejected Senator Bennett's postadoption attempt to clarify the
meaning of the amendment, see note 45 supra, on the ground that the senators who had
approved the amendment had not relied on it, but rather relied on Senator Bennett's earlier
explanation. Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979).
e' 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 597 & n.16. The defendant argued that the present regu-
lations were entitled to little weight, because previous regulations, promulgated in 1965,
provided that the equal work standard was to be used in Title VII cases. Id. at 597. Noting
that the previous regulations also provided that coverage under Title VII was coextensive
with, but not limited to coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, see 30 Fed. Reg.
14,928 (1965), the IUE court rejected the defendant's argument, interpreting the 1965 regu-
lations to mean that the equal work standard was applicable in situations where both stat-
utes are applicable. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 597.
6 Id. at 598.
623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980)
(No. 80-429).
68 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 598 n.19.
69 623 F.2d at 1308.
70 Id. at 1310-11.
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strictures of the equal work standard .7  To hold otherwise, the
court stated, would frustrate the remedial purpose of Title VII by
insulating from review discriminatory practices which were as
harmful as those expressly outlawed.7 2 Although the court recog-
nized that problems of proof might present substantial barriers, it
nevertheless ruled that the plaintiffs should be afforded the oppor-
tunity to establish a claim of discrimination. 73
71 Id. at 1311-12. The Gunther court found that the legislative history of the Bennett
Amendment, though scant, supported the plaintiffs' contention that Title VII incorporated
the affirmative defenses of the EPA, but not its equal work standard. Id. In so holding, the
Gunther court relied on a previous interpretation of the Bennett Amendment by the Ninth
Circuit to the same effect, Manhart v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 623 F.2d at 1312. In Man-
hart, the plaintiffs challenged a retirement plan that required greater contributions by wo-
men. 553 F.2d at 583. The Ninth Circuit held that such a plan was unaffected by any of the
EPA affirmative defenses and that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporated those de-
fenses into Title VII. Id. at 590. The Gunther court also relied on the statement in Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978), that a "sex predicated wage differential is immune from attack under Title VII only
if it comes within one of the four enumerated exceptions to the Equal Pay Act." 623 F.2d at
1312. The Laffey holding is not as significant as it appears to be, however, because in that
case, the court found the work of the male and female employees to be substantially equal.
567 F.2d at 451. See also Gitt & Gelb, supra note 39, at 749-50.
72 623 F.2d at 1313 n.9. The court posited the situation which existed in Rinkel v. Asso-
ciated Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978), wherein the
plaintiff offered to prove that her employer had told her that he would pay her a higher
salary if she were a man. Although the Rinkel court denied the plaintiff's claim under the
EPA because she occupied a unique position, and the Act contemplated a comparison be-
tween two positions, id. at 226, the Gunther court found no indication "that the Bennett
Amendment was intended to legalize such practices under Title VII," 623 F.2d at 1313 n.9.
See note 93 and accompanying text infra.
11 623 F.2d at 1314. Subsequent to Gunther, the Tenth Circuit, without referring to
Gunther, also held that the Bennett Amendment does not incorporate the equal work stan-
dard of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d
945 (10th Cir. 1980), the plaintiff, a female employee, sued her employer under Title VII
alleging discrimination in compensation and denial of opportunities for advancement on the
ground of sex. Id. at 948. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that she performed most of the du-
ties of the Director of the Advertising Department, but received neither the title of Adver-
tising Director nor pay commensurate with her work. Id. at 949. The district court agreed
that plaintiff had been undercompensated, id. at 949-50, and stated that the EPA had been
violated in connection therewith, id. at 952, notwithstanding that no such violation had been
alleged.
The defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that the court had erred in finding
sexual discrimination in compensation because the plaintiff did not perform all the duties of
the Advertising Director. Id. at 953. In holding that the Bennett Amendment incorporated
only the affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the
cases the defendant had relied on, stating that they did not address the question of whether
discrimination which does not violate the EPA could violate Title VII. Id. at 953-54 & n.2.
Noting that the case was "not a case in which a discriminatory activity is specifically sanc-
tioned under the [EPA] exceptions and liability is, nonetheless, sought under Title VII,"
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It is submitted that the Gunther and IUE courts correctly in-
terpreted the Bennett Amendment. Since the legislative history of
the amendment is ambiguous, 4 it appears that the better approach
is to construe the provision, as did the Third and Ninth Circuits,
consistently with the broad remedial purpose of the entire statute,
rather than to attempt to clarify the questionable section in isola-
tion.75 As the Third Circuit pointed out, adherence to the contrary
approach, wherein Title VII has been held to incorporate the equal
work standard, would afford less protection to plaintiffs who claim
sexual discrimination in compensation than is accorded to a plain-
tiff in a claim for wage discrimination based on race. 6 Since the
the court held that a finding of discrimination under the latter statute did not violate the
former. Id. at 953 n.2 (emphasis added).
By its holding in Fitzgerald, the Tenth Circuit appears to have overruled, sub silentio,
its earlier decision in Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971), where it held that to
establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination in compensation under Title VII, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that she has performed equal work. Id. at 120.
7' See note 45 and accompanying text supra. It is interesting to note that legal writers
who attempted to define the relationship between Title VII and the EPA shortly after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act did not believe that the Bennett Amendment incorporated
the EPA standard into Title VII claims for sexual discrimination in compensation. See
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 62, 75-76 (1964); Tolan, Discrimination: Sex and Age Questions, 21 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LAB. 59, 61-62 (1968). In fact, there appeared to be a question as to whether the Bennett
Amendment even incorporated the affirmative defenses of the Act. Rather, the commenta-
tors felt that the word "authorized" in the amendment, see note 9 supra, pertained to the
coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Berg, supra, at 75-76; Tolan, supra, at 61-62.
Moreover, the EEOC guidelines promulgated in 1967 stated that while Title VII's ban on
sex discrimination in compensation overlaps with the EPA, Title VII is not limited to the
EPA's express coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1967) (superceded by 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8
(1979)). The present guidelines make the same reference, but state further: "By virtue of
section 703(h) [The Bennett Amendment], a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under Title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
Thus, while there was general disagreement as to the relationship between Title VII and the
EPA at the time of the Bennett Amendment's enactment, there was little support for the
proposition that the amendment applied the equal work standard to Title VII cases. But see
Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 718.
7 An expansive interpretation of the Bennett Amendment is consistent with the tenet
of statutory construction that civil rights legislation should be broadly construed in order to
effectuate its remedial purposes. 3 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05, at 392
(4th ed. C. Sands 1974). Further, applying the rule of construction that the words of a stat-
ute have their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, Burns
v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975), it is suggested that the language of the Bennett
Amendment tends to support the proposition that only the affirmative defenses of the EPA
are incorporated into Title VII, rather than the equal work standard, since the word "au-
thorize" implies an affirmative sanction, rather than a mere absence of prohibition.
76 IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1980).
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equal work standard of the EPA does not apply to race claims, the
restrictive interpretation of the Bennett Amendment would not be
extended to these claims under Title VII."7 In approving the sex
amendment to the statute, however, Congress did not intend to
treat women differently from blacks. Rather, the amendment was
favored because it would ensure that employers would not be able
to discriminate against white females with impunity.78
In light of the decisions in Gunther and IUE, the question
arises as to whether the broadened interpretation of Title VII ef-
fectively nullifies the EPA. Unlike the EPA, Title VII is, no doubt,
broad enough to provide a remedy for the whole spectrum of dis-
criminatory compensation practices,7 9 as well as for claims of dis-
crimination in hiring or promotion." Hence, because of its broader
jurisdictional base, it appears likely that Title VII will be the stat-
ute under which most, if not all, future claims for discrimination in
compensation will be brought.8 1 Nevertheless, it would be inaccu-
rate to suggest that the EPA is rendered entirely superfluous by
the enactment of and liberal construction recently given to Title
VII. Notably, the provisions differ significantly with respect to the
time within which some action must be taken to preserve a claim
and the availability of a jury trial. Under Title VII, a plaintiff may
lose his cause of action if charges are not filed with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the alleged
discrimination.8 2 The EPA, on the other hand, provides for a two-
7 See Lowe v. WCAU-T.V., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 594, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Quarles, the black plaintiffs
alleged that the employer deliberately paid them lower wages than white employees. 279 F.
Supp. at 507. In the course of concluding that the job of casing attendant, a position re-
served for blacks, was underpaid relative to the comparable job of basic machine operator,
which was reserved for white employees, the court found that the rate of pay of the casing
attendant had not been "determined through work analysis and evaluation of all jobs
throughout the plant, but solely through comparison of his job with jobs held only by ne-
groes." Id. The court held that such an employment practice was intentional, unlawful dis-
crimination. Id. at 510.
7' See 110 CONG. REc. 2579-80 (1964) (colloquy between Reps.- Griffiths and Cellar).
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
80 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
1 The proscriptions against discrimination in Title VII are applicable to industries "af-
fecting commerce," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), a much broader standard than "engaged in
commerce," which is found in the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976). Additionally, the Act ex-
empts numerous groups from coverage, see 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976), including domestic ser-
vants, id. § 213(a)(15), and retail establishments not meeting certain dollar volume require-
ments, id. § 213(a)(2), that are covered by Title VII.
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) & (f) (1976).
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year statute of limitations." In addition, a jury trial is available
under the EPA with respect to certain claims, 4 in contrast to Title
VII which makes no provision for trial by jury. 5 Although, at first
blush, such differences appear to militate in favor of retaining a
cause of action under the EPA, it must be noted that the difficulty
of proving that jobs are substantially equal under the EPA"' would
allow relatively few plaintiffs to benefit from these advantages.
In light of the judicial trend to construe Title VII as not incor-
porating the equal work standard of the EPA, it appears that
courts will be considering Title VII claims based on such theories
as comparable worth and comparable work. There is, therefore, a
need to delineate the boundaries of a prima facie case of wage dis-
crimination based on Title VII.
THEORY AND PROOF
Courts construing Title VII have developed several theories on
which a claim of discrimination may be predicated. Depending on
the facts, a plaintiff may define his case in terms of disparate
treatment, adverse impact, present effects of past discrimination,
and reasonable accommodation.8 7 Generally, however, wage dis-
crimination claims seem to be most amenable to analysis under the
disparate treatment 8 and adverse impact theories.89
Disparate Treatment
Under the disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show
that the employer allowed himself to be consciously influenced by
sex in deciding the rate of pay." Central to establishing a prima
83 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976).
4 Since the EPA is to be enforced in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Carter v. Marshall, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5269 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the rule that a claim under
the Fair Labor Standards Act is entitled to a jury trial applies to the EPA, Wirtz v. Jones,
340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1965).
"5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1976). See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.
1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
8a See, e.g., Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1977); Angelo v.
Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1977).
67 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
See notes 90-116 and accompanying text infra.
88 See notes 124-40 and accompanying text infra.
90 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, INTERPRETIVE MANUAL 37-38
(1972)[hereinafter cited as EEOC INTERPRETIVE MANUAL].
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facie case under this theory, therefore, is proof of discriminatory
intent.9 1 While under the EPA a tacit presumption of intent to dis-
criminate arises once the test of substantial equality is met,92 Title
VII provides no standards which, if violated, would give rise to a
presumption of intent. A plaintiff must, therefore, produce either
direct or circumstantial evidence of intent in order to make out a
prima facie case of disparate treatment under the statute.
Direct evidence, such as admissions by the employer, would be
particularly useful to an employee seeking to establish that sex was
a factor in determining the rate of pay; 3 such proof of intent, how-
ever, is rarely available. Therefore, plaintiffs generally have been
allowed to prove intent to discriminate through the use of compar-
ative evidence-a form of circumstantial evidence. In a treatment
case, comparative evidence is employed to determine whether dif-
ferent employees are similarly situated.95 Since antidiscrimination
statutes require that similarly situated people be treated simi-
larly,96 it is reasonable to infer that any disparate treatment of
similarly situated persons was motivated by discriminatory in-
tent,97 unless an adequate nondiscriminatory explanation is offered
Id.
92 See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974); Shultz v. Wheaton
Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
3 See Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 397-99 (D. Or. 1970), af'd, 492
F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); EEOC INMa' RPRTM MANUAL, supra note 90, at 47. Rinkel v. Asso-
ciated Pipeline Contractors, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 224 (D. Alaska 1978), illustrates a
situation where an employer's admission exposed his discriminatory motive. In Rinkel, the
plaintiff sued under the EPA claiming that her employer underpaid her because she was a
woman. Id. at 224-25. She introduced evidence that her employer admitted he would have
paid her a higher salary if she were a man. Id. at 226. The court granted summary judgment
for the defendant, holding that the Act necessarily contemplated a comparison between two
jobs and since plaintiff's position was "unique," the Act could not apply. Id. The court
indicated, however, that such treatment could violate other laws. Id. See note 72 supra.
"' See, e.g., Marquez v. Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971); Gates v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397 (D. Or. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
"I See EEOC INTERPRETr MANUAL, supra note 90, at 48-49. Comparative evidence, of
course, must relate to a sufficiently large number of similarly situated persons to provide a
meaningful basis for drawing an inference. Id. Hence, if the comparison is on a one-to-one
basis, the inference is weak. Id.
"See id.
" B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 87, at 16. Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co.,
596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979), presents a striking illustration of the use of comparative evi-
dence to present a prima facie case of disparate treatment. In Roesel, the plaintiff, a Person-
nel Director, was one of only two women in management at the defendant company; the two
women were the lowest paid members of management. Id. at 185. Addressing the plaintiff's
allegation that she had been the victim of sex-based wage discrimination, the court initially
determined that the jobs performed by the women were substantially equal. Id. at 186. Ob-
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for the different treatment.9 8
An attempt to raise an inference of discriminatory intent by
contrasting jobs would constitute the typical application of com-
parative evidence. Since, under a liberal construction of the Ben-
nett Amendment, Title VII permits actions requiring the compari-
son of unequal jobs, a criterion other than equal work is necessary
in order to determine whether a pay differential is the result of
discriminatory intent. One possible criterion is "comparable
worth" which presumes that jobs of equal worth to the employer
should receive the same pay.99 "Proportionate equality," also
known as comparable pay for comparable work, is another possible
criterion.100 Indeed, this latter criterion was employed by the Gun-
ther plaintiffs who, in alleging that a portion of the pay discrep-
ancy could be attributable only to sexual discrimination, 101 were
really claiming that a pay disparity based on legitimate job differ-
serving that the company had given a raise to the other woman after a government agent
reviewing the company's affirmative action program suggested that her salary was out of line
in comparison to that of a male Production Control Supervisor, id. at 185, the court inferred
that the company would have paid a male performing the same work as the plaintiff a
higher salary and thus found the discriminatory intent requisite to a Title VII violation, id.
at 186.
11 While the burden of proving disparate treatment falls upon the plaintiff, the defen-
dant has the burden of establishing a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In meeting this burden, however, it is not
necessary for the defendant to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive. Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978) (per curiam).
99 See Lewin, The 'Pink Collar' Revolution, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Ben-
netts, The Equal Pay Issue: Focusing on Comparable Worth, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at
20, col. 1; Curran, Eleanor Holmes Norton Attacks Job Bias, WORKING WOMAN, Mar. 1980,
at 43; Moore, Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value?, ENTERPRISE, Aug. 1979, at 13; Galloway
& Archuleta, Sex and Salary: Equal Pay for Comparable Work, AMERICAN LIBRARS, May
1978, at 281. Comparable worth was conceived to address the more pervasive discrimination,
lying beyond the proscriptive ambit of the EPA, that affects women who perform work
which, although different from that traditionally performed by men, is of equal value. See
Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Lab., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 288 (1978-1979)(statement of Alexis Herman, Director,
Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Lab.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Several labor organizations have spoken out in favor of the comparable worth theory,
which has been called the "most significant unresolved issue on the Title VII horizon." See
Hearings, supra, at 394. In fact, within the past several years, a few unions have been able
to negotiate comparable worth clauses in their collective bargaining contracts. See U.S. Bu-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425 MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: WAGE ADMINISTRATION PROVISIONS 17 (1978).
100 See Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303, 1309-14 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 80-429). See generally Greenfield, From
Equal to Equivalent Pay: Salary Discrimination in Academia, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 41 (1977).
'0' 623 F.2d at 1309-14.
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ences should be in proportion to those differences.
The use of worth as a standard of comparison through which
discriminatory intent is inferred necessarily presupposes that rela-
tive worth is capable of objective measurement. Job evaluation was
conceived to fulfill this purpose.102 A basic tenet of job evaluation
theory is that the best determinant of value is the job itself, not
the person occupying it. 03 The theory also assumes that, in deter-
mining the value of jobs, there are constants which exist in every
position regardless of individual differences. The most common
constants are skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions,' °
the very factors written into the EPA.1
05
Three stages are involved in the job evaluation process: job
analysis, job ranking, and setting wage and salary rates.106 Job
102 J. PATTON, C. LrrrLFILn, & S. SELF, JOB EVALUATION, TEXT AND CASES 4 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as PATTON, LITTLEFIELD & SELF]. Job evaluation, however, has only
rarely been used to determine whether work is equal. See Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument
Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977); Thompson v. Boyle, 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 57 (D.D.C.
1979); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
There are several frequently utilized methods of job evaluation, including ranking, clas-
sification, factor comparison, and the point method system. See generally NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW
(1979) (Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) [hereinafter
cited as NAS REPORT]. The NAS REPORT, a study on the feasibility of utilizing job evalua-
tion to determine the value of jobs, was commissioned by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, see id. at xi, which, on July 1, 1979, assumed jurisdiction over the EPA,
EEOC Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978). Although the NAS
REPORT is only an interim report, the ultimate aim of the National Academy of Sciences is
to assess the feasibility of utilizing job evaluation techniques in wage discrimination cases
under Title VII. NAS REPORT, supra, at xii. It is hoped that after the NAS finally concludes
its study, the EEOC will promulgate guidelines relating to wage discrimination which will
harmonize the EPA and Title VII.
103 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 1; PATTON, LITTLEFIELD & SELF, supra note 102, at
4.
104 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 7; PATTON, LITrLEFIELD & SELF, supra note 102, at
114.
... See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976). The equal work standard of the EPA was couched
in terms of equal skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions at the behest of indus-
try representatives who felt that the original definition of equal work contained in the Act
- jobs requiring equal skills - was vague and incomplete. See Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1974).
Although it is generally accepted that factors apply equally across jobs within a speci-
fied job family, controversy exists whether the factors apply across job families. See NAS
REPORT, supra note 102, at 6; PATTON, LrTLEFIELD & SELF, supra note 102, at 15. If it is
established that jobs cannot be compared across job families, it seems that suits for compa-
rable worth will be foreclosed where the greatest job segregation and the greatest pay dis-
parity exist. See NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 11.
100 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 1. Job analysis is the process of studying the duties,
responsibilities, and conditions of a job for the purpose of preparing a job specification-a
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ranking is the most significant step in determining the relative
value of jobs. One common method of ranking, the point system,
seems particularly adaptable for use in establishing a prima facie
treatment case. The point method system involves selection of a
set of compensable factors which are further broken down into
levels representing a hierarchy of worth. 10 7 Each level is assigned a
given range of points.108 Each factor is rated separately and is as-
signed a corresponding number of points for its rated level. 0 9 The
points are totaled to yield a job-worth score." 0 Comparison of the
scores of male and female jobs with their respective salaries would
appear, therefore, to allow an inference of discriminatory intent.
It appears that use of comparative evidence consisting of job
evaluation analysis of the positions in question to raise an infer-
ence of intentional discrimination will necessarily produce a battle
of the experts. An expert retained by the employee presumably
will testify that his procedure would evaluate the employee's job at
a higher rate and, if the employer has in effect a plan of its own,
may attempt to impeach that plan. In rebuttal, the defendant may
produce an expert of his own to justify his wage setting policies or
to attack the plaintiff's analysis.""
Another means by which an employee, predicating his claim
on disparate treatment, may attempt to establish discriminatory
intent is regression analysis, which seeks to establish proportionate
equality."2 Unlike job evaluation analysis, which identifies com-
job description which, in addition, contains the skill, effort, responsibility, and working con-
dition requirements necessary to the fulfillment of the work assignment. See id.; PATTON,
LITTLEFIELD & SELF, supra note 102, at 67. Prior to the writing of the job description, job
data is secured, usually through a job questionnaire. The securing of data is critical, since
fair job evaluation depends on the accuracy of the underlying facts. PATTON, LITTLEFIELD &
SELF, supra note 102, at 65. Common items of information include duties, percentage of
time devoted to each duty, responsibilities, knowledge and skills needed, performance stan-
dards to be met, working conditions, and hazards. Id. at 68-69. In the second step of job
evaluation, a hierarchy of jobs within the firm is established. See NAS REPORT, supra note
102, at 1. The setting of wage or salary rates, the final step of job evaluation, utilizes the
results of job analysis and job ranking. The rates cannot be determined in a vacuum, how-
ever, and hence are usually set after a survey of prevailing market rates and consideration of
various other factors, including union demands and company policy decisions. See id. at 2.
107 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 4.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I See, e.g., Thompson v. Boyle, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 57 (D.D.C. 1979).
112 For an illustration of the use of regression analysis to prove sex-based wage discrimi-
nation in an academic setting, see Greenfield, From Equal to Equivalent Pay: Salary Dis-
crimination in Academia, 6 J. LAW & EDUC. 41 (1977).
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pensable factors, assigns them a numerical value, and then com-
pares the amount of these factors in two different jobs, regression
analysis quantifies the relationship between salary and the factors
used to measure skill, effort, and responsibility.113 This method
theoretically enables the parties to eliminate from consideration
salary differences attributable to the compensable factors.' 14 It
may be inferred, therefore, that any residual wage difference is at-
tributable to sex discrimination.1 5 After an employee establishes
such a residual wage differential, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for it."'
Thus, in summary, disparate treatment theory may be em-
ployed where it is alleged that an employer is paying a woman a
lower salary than a similarly situated man simply because she is a
woman. Intent, the crucial element of this theory, may be estab-
lished by direct evidence. Where such evidence is unavailable, cir-
cumstantial evidence, such as that provided by job evaluation and
regression analysis, generally may be employed to establish intent.
I's Id. at 50. The purpose of regression analysis is to discover a relationship between
various explanatory factors, bearing on skill, effort, and responsibility, and the salary for
men. Id. Once this relationship is discovered, it is then used to make salary predictions for
women. Id.
To effectively apply the regression model, the plaintiff must isolate variables which logi-
cally relate to skill, effort, and responsibility. Id. at 52. Experience, education, and ability
may be relevant, along with mental effort. Id. Responsibility might be measured by adminis-
trative and supervisory duties. Id. at 53. Although the list of variables may be expanded, the
plaintiff should choose between the simplicity of using few variables and the accuracy of
using many. Id.
14 Id. at 50.
"' See id. Regression analysis probably would have aided the Gunther plaintiffs to es-
tablish that a portion of the pay differential between male and female guards could be at-
tributed only to sex discrimination. See Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303, 1314 &
n.11 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1980) (No. 80-429).
'" See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Notably, regres-
sion analysis has not been well received in the two courts that have considered it in a salary
discrimination context. In Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978),
modified, 476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 1979), the court acknowledged that the plaintiff had
established that women earned less than men at Western by overwhelming statistical evi-
dence. 461 F. Supp. at 913. The court refused, however, to accept the regression analysis of
the plaintiff's expert for the purpose of computing back pay, because it found his criteria
arbitrary and subjective and his testimony incomprehensible. Id. at 914.
In Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), af'd, 582 F.2d
1275 (3d Cir. 1978) (mem.), the plaintiff's expert presented a regression analysis which re-
vealed a statistically significant disparity between the salaries of male and female professors.
Id. at 614. Although the court stated that this evidence would have stated a prima facie case
absent evidence to discredit it, the court rejected the analysis because the expert did not
include rank, a crucial determinant of salary, as a factor. Id. at 615.
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Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit, in denying a petition for
rehearing in Gunther, filed an opinion limiting the use of circum-
stantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimi-
nation under Title VII.117 Stating that the effect of its decision
would not be to "substitute a 'comparable' work standard for an
'equal' work standard,"'118 the court held that when a Title VII
plaintiff attempts to establish a prima facie case based solely on
job comparisons, the equal work standard will apply."" The Ninth
Circuit did not preclude establishment of a prima facie case of sex-
based wage discrimination based on "some other theory compati-
ble with Title VII," 20 but the court declined to suggest what theo-
ries might be feasible. 12' Although noting that a comparable work
standard would not necessarily be irrelevant in proving discrimina-
tion under an alternative theory, the court emphasized that, with-
out more, such evidence would not be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. 122
It is suggested, however, that the Ninth Circuit's restriction on
the use of circumstantial evidence in Title VII cases is not man-
dated by the statute's legislative history. Although Congress, in en-
acting the EPA, disapproved of a comparability standard, 23 no
such limitation appears in the legislative history of Title VII and,
indeed, Title VII's broad proscription against wage discrimination
based on sex militates against such a restrictive view. Moreover,
the Gunther dicta ignores the apparent utility of comparative evi-
dence to establish a Title VII claim.
Adverse Impact
The Supreme Court has held that employment practices which
impact adversely on particular protected groups violate Title VII if
not justified by a showing of business necessity. 2 4 In such cases
proof of intent is not necessary to establish a violation of the stat-
ute, since Title VII is addressed to the consequences of employ-
,17 623 F.2d 1303, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980).
118 Id. at 1321.
210 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
100 See 109 CONG. REc. 9197 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
1" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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ment practices as well as their motivations. 25 Hence, where ad-
verse impact is shown, liability under Title VII cannot be avoided
by introducing evidence of lack of discriminatory motive on the
employer's part.126
Adverse impact theory is no doubt relevant in cases where an
employer uses a device such as a scored test to select applicants,
and the test operates to the detriment of a protected group either
because of inherent biases in the test itself or because of an educa-
tional deficiency on the test taker's part.127 It is submitted that the
theory is particularly applicable to situations where job evaluation
procedures adversely affect women's wages. " Indeed, while job
evaluation may aid a victim of wage discrimination to establish in-
tent under a treatment theory, the procedure may prove to be the
source of the discrimination under an impact theory because, while
neutral on its face, it has the potential at each stage' 2 for individ-
ual bias and arbitrariness, albeit unintentional, on the part of the
evaluator.
Three aspects of job evaluation seem particularly susceptible
to bias: writing the job description, selecting the compensable fac-
tors, and weighting such factors. 3 0 Since the job description forms
the basis for the subsequent evaluation,' 3' it must be preceded by
a thorough job analysis if the evaluation is to be objective. 32 Job
analysis itself is susceptible to bias because the value system and
the perceptions of the analyst influence not only what information
is collected, but also the manner in which it is collected.133 Conse-
125 Id. at 432.
128 Id.
12 Id. at 436. In Griggs, the Supreme Court observed that job testing is not forbidden
by Title VII; rather, the Civil Rights Act demands that if a test is used, it "must measure
the person for the job and not the person in the abstract." Id.
128 See Blumrosen, supra note 39, at 462-63.
119 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
110 See NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 35; Blumrosen, supra note 39, at 434-41; Rem-
ick, Strategies for Creating Sound, Bias-Free Job Evaluation Plans in INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS COUNSELORS, INC., JOB EVALUATION AN EEO: THE EMERGING ISSUES 85-91 (1978);
Thomsen, Eliminating Pay Discrimination Caused by Job Evaluation, PERSONNEL, Sept.-
Oct. 1978, at 16-18.
13 PATrON, LrITLEFIELD & SELF, supra note 102, at 65; Blumrosen, supra note 39, at
435.
..2 PATTON, LrrrLEFniw & SELF, supra note 102, at 65.
13 See Blumrosen, supra note 39, at 435. Inaccuracies can be caused intentionally by
emphasizing duties seldom performed, or by making a job appear more important than it
really is. Id. Unconscious bias may also creep in, causing the analyst to make certain jobs
appear harder than they really are. Id. Additionally, if the analyst depends on information
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quently, any biases or inaccuracies in the job analysis may be car-
ried forward into the job description, and ultimately may be re-
flected in the qualifications for the job as established by the job
description.13
4
The selection of factors to be evaluated also may represent a
source of undervaluation of female wages because evaluators tend
to assign points to characteristics found primarily in male-domi-
nated jobs. 135 For example, "effort" tends to be defined in terms of
the strength needed to do heavy work, without regard for the re-
peated lifting of light objects which tends to occur in female-domi-
nated jobs.136 Measurements of "manual skill," moreover, fre-
quently emphasize ability to handle tools rather than manual
dexterity, thereby downgrading the fine assembly work performed
largely by women.137 In addition, in assessing responsibility, evalu-
ators tend to give credit to responsibility for property, a character-
istic of male jobs, but downplay or ignore the responsibility for
people, which is part of many female jobs. 38
The determination of the weight to be assigned to the various
compensable factors, the third step in job evaluation, is also sus-
ceptible to the biases of the evaluator. When factors are weighted
through the use of a point system, pay disparities occur because
the same biases that operated in the selection of factors also influ-
ence the weight to be given to them.139 If effort, for example, is
provided by a supervisor, the supervisor's attitudes and biases may be unconsciously re-
corded by the analyst. For example, most executives are incapable of giving a complete and
accurate description of tasks performed by their secretaries, because a good secretary fre-
quently will take care of administrative detail without bothering the boss. NAS REPORT,
supra note 102, at 45.
134 Blumrosen, supra note 39, at 436. Obviously, if the job description is written by the
same person who did the job analysis, or by someone with a similar point of view, it is
unlikely that the job description will contain any information not provided by the job analy-
sis. Id.; see NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 46.
Remick, supra note 130, at 85.
138 See id. at 86. It has been suggested that a bias-free evaluation system might give
points for total weight lifted during the day. Id. Job evaluation systems not only ignore the
type of effort typically found in women's jobs, NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 38, they also
tend to weight male effort more heavily than skill, thus reflecting traditional attitudes to-
ward male jobs involving effort. Thomsen, supra note 130, at 16; see, e.g., Hodgson v. Daisy
Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538, 547 (W.D. Ark. 1970), modified per curiam, 445 F.2d 823 (8th
Cir. 1971).
137 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 38.
11 Remick, supra note 130, at 87. A bias-free job evaluation system arguably would
include a range of points from routine "people" responsibility, such as daycare, to life and
death responsibility, such as nursing.
139 NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 39. Personal bias of the evaluator is not the only
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determined from the perspective of a male job, an evaluator may
conclude that a female job requires no effort since it entails a dif-
ferent kind of effort.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet specified the quan-
tum of adverse impact that is necessary to establish a prima facie
case,140 it is submitted that in a wage discrimination suit the em-
ployee's burden should be discharged upon proof that an inaccu-
rate job description has adversely affected the selection of factors
to be weighted. Alternatively, if it can be shown that the selection
of factors is prejudicial, it should not be necessary to show that a
job description is inadequate. Indeed, factor selection probably has
the greatest influence in the evaluation process, since a factor must
be present in order to be weighted.
Defenses to Wage Discrimination Actions
Section 703(h) of Title VII' and section 206(d)(1) of the
EPA, incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, 43
exempt certain conduct of the employer from the ban on discrimi-
nation. Often raised by the employer as affirmative defenses to re-
but the employee's prima facie case of discrimination, these ex-
emptions include seniority systems, differences based on quality or
quantity of production, or differences based on any factor other
than sex.144 Employers have also raised certain defenses not enu-
merated in either statute that might dilute the value of the Act
and Title VII if endorsed by the courts.
In suits under the Act, employers have attempted to raise the
economic costs of employing women as a justification for a wage
differential based on sex.145 Cases construing the Act have consist-
ently rejected this defense as violative of the explicit mandate of
the statute.14 The cost justification defense likewise has been re-
cause of inequitable factor weighting. Different job evaluation systems tend to put different
amounts of emphasis on various factors. Id. at 42. Thus, problems in factor weighting may
arise if job evaluation systems do not include factors found in female jobs, or if those factors
are not given reasonable weight relative to those of male jobs. Remick, supra note 130, at
89.
89 o B. ScHLEI & P. GRoSS AN, supra note 87, at 35 (Supp. 1979).
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
142 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
143 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
144 Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
145 See Blumrosen, supra note 39, at 447-48.
146 E.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1974); Brennan v. Vic-
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jected under Title VII, on the ground that employers are required
to treat members of protected groups as individuals rather than as
components of a larger class.147 Thus, while it may be true that the
costs of employing women are generally higher because of factors
such as greater turnover and more frequent leaves of absence, an
individual woman who works in the same job for several years
without a single absence cannot be paid a lower salary based upon
such assumptions and generalizations.148
Another defense frequently raised by employers is that market
forces of supply and demand require them to pay higher wages to
male employees to obtain their labor.149 In cases under the Act, it
has been held that Congress did not intend to protect differentials
based on such factors.150 The defense has also arisen in two suits
under Title VII. Although the plaintiffs in both cases argued un-
successfully that the Bennett Amendment did not incorporate the
equal work standard of the EPA into Title VII, the effect of supply
and demand on discrimination was the central issue. 51 In each
case, the plaintiff employees, members of an all-female occupa-
tional class of workers, alleged that the employer paid higher
wages to a predominantly male occupational class for work that
was equal in value.152 The employers defended on the ground that
the market forced them to pay higher wages to the men in order to
attract them.153 Both courts upheld the validity of the wage differ-
entials, holding that Congress did not intend Title VII to abrogate
the law of supply and demand,1T or to eliminate the effect of other
factors, such as the collective bargaining process, that determine
toria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479
F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726
(5th Cir. 1970). But see Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
147 See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-10 (1978).
See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969).
148 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708.
149 See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 355-57 (8th Cir. 1977); Lemons v. Denver, 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906, 911 (D. Colo. 1978), afl'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 80-82).
'1o Christensen v. Iowa: 563 F.2d at 356; Lemons v. Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at
909-10.
15 See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d at 355-56; Lemons v. Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. at 909-11.
152 563 F.2d at 354; 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 910.
151 563 F.2d at 354; 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 910.
1 563 F.2d at 356; 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 909.
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wage rates.
The difference in the analysis of the market forces defense
under the EPA and under Title VII appears to be related directly
to the fact that equal jobs are being compared under the EPA,
while Title VII allows plaintiffs to compare different jobs. Logic
dictates that the defense should not be allowed under the Equal
Pay Act because there usually is no reason to pay men a higher
wage to perform a job because of a scarce male labor supply when
women are available to perform the same job.1 55 When a pay dis-
parity between different jobs is at issue, however, supply and de-
mand become more relevant because traditional job segregation
between the sexes has caused certain jobs to be composed of
predominantly male or female workers. Indeed, it has been argued
that existing supply and demand forces are directly attributable to
discriminatory job segregation which historically crowded females
into a small number of occupations, depressed their wages, and ar-
tificially inflated wages in all-male jobs. 56 Consequently, the argu-
ment continues, an employer's reliance on market forces in setting
wage rates necessarily discriminates against women in violation of
Title VII.157
Notwithstanding this assertion, however, it is submitted that a
bona fide market justification for disparate wages between jobs
equal in value effectively rebuts the inference of discrimination
raised in the prima facie case. While it may be true that market
forces are the result of historical job segregation, reliance on the
market rate does not constitute present discrimination that can be
attributed to the defendant employer. Because the supply of quali-
fied workers becomes a more critical factor as jobs become less
similar, it appears that the market justification defense will limit
wage discrimination actions to jobs within the same job family.
The more alike the jobs at issue are, the less likely it will be that
labor market factors will influence pay rates. It is suggested, more-
over, that judicial equalization of wages in dissimilar jobs affected
by supply and demand is not the solution to sexual pay disparities.
"' See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974); EEOC Dec. No. 70-
112, 1973 EEOC Dec. (CCH) T 6,108 (Sept. 5, 1969).
"' See Stevenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation By Occupation in C. LLOYD,
SEx, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DMWSION OF LABOR 175, 175 (1975).
"17 See NAS REPORT, supra note 102, at 5 (pay rates are determined by referring to the
market system out of a desire, whether conscious or unconscious, to maintain the status
quo); Thomsen, supra note 130, at 18.
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Rather, such disparities can best be remedied by sexual integration
of segregated jobs. The provisions of Title VII banning discrimina-
tion in hiring and promotion will facilitate this end by breaking
down barriers erected by the employer. 158
CONCLUSION
Although envisioned as a pervasive attack on discriminatory
employment practices, Title VII, by virtue of a restrictive interpre-
tation of the Bennett Amendment, for more than a decade had
been interpreted as inapplicable to wage discrimination actions not
predicated on a claim of equal pay for equal work. Only recently
have courts begun to recognize that the scope of the provisions ex-
tends beyond violations redressable under the EPA and, indeed,
has the potential to provide a remedy for some of the more subtle
forms of discrimination in compensation to which women have
been subjected. To date, however, the courts which have endorsed
this liberal construction of Title VII have declined to propose al-
ternate theories under which plaintiffs may present a prima facie
case of wage discrimination. Therefore, contemplating the continu-
ation of the judicial trend to expansively interpret the statute, this
Note has attempted to suggest theories-consistent with Title VII
caselaw-under which claims that fail to meet the restrictive equal
work standard of the EPA may be brought. It is submitted that
judicial acceptance and development of these and similar theories
is required if sexually discriminatory compensation practices, to
which Title VII is in part addressed, are to be eradicated.
Clara S. Licata
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976). While Title VII prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against a protected group in hiring or promotion, it does not force an employer
to institute an affirmative action program to remedy existing imbalances. Id. Thus, an em-
ployer, in choosing between two equally qualified male and female candidates, would not be
forced to choose the female over the male.
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